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The authors suggest that the traditional conception of prejudice—as a general attitude or evaluation—can
problematically obscure the rich texturing of emotions that people feel toward different groups. Derived
from a sociofunctional approach, the authors predicted that groups believed to pose qualitatively distinct
threats to in-group resources or processes would evoke qualitatively distinct and functionally relevant
emotional reactions. Participants’ reactions to a range of social groups provided a data set unique in the
scope of emotional reactions and threat beliefs explored. As predicted, different groups elicited different
profiles of emotion and threat reactions, and this diversity was often masked by general measures of
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Jews are shrewd, religious, and wealthy. African Americans are
noisy, athletic, and “have an attitude.” Italians are loyal to family,
loud, and tradition loving. And the Irish are talkative, happy-go-
lucky, and quick tempered. These stereotypes, recently endorsed
by American college students (Madon et al., 2001), straightfor-
wardly demonstrate that people hold different beliefs about differ-
ent groups. Researchers have long recognized this and have been
documenting since the 1930s the diversity of stereotypes used to
describe different groups (e.g., Devine & Elliot, 1995; Gilbert,
1951; Karlins, Coffman, & Walters, 1969; Katz & Braly, 1933;
Niemann, Jennings, Rozelle, Baxter, & Sullivan, 1994).
Researchers have seemingly been less interested, however, in
the diversity of people’s feelings toward different groups. Al-
though Allport (1954) noted that negative prejudice can include
specific “feelings of scorn or dislike, of fear or aversion” (p. 7), his
own theorizing focused more on his macroscopic characterization
of negative prejudice as an unfavorable feeling toward a group and
its members. This latter conceptualization of prejudice, as a gen-
eral attitude or evaluation, has long dominated the research liter-
ature and has been the focus of most theoretical and empirical
approaches designed to explicate the origins, operations, and im-
plications of intergroup feelings (for a review, see Brewer &
Brown, 1998). As useful as this global view of prejudice has been,
we believe there is great value in contemplating seriously Allport’s
more textured observation—that just as people may hold qualita-
tively distinct beliefs about different groups, they may feel qual-
itatively distinct emotions toward different groups.
A small set of researchers has begun to explore this possibility
(e.g., Brewer & Alexander, 2002; Dijker, 1987; Esses, Haddock, &
Zanna, 1993; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Mackie, Devos, &
Smith, 2000); we review their approaches below. Our own belief
in the importance of understanding the textured emotional reac-
tions people have toward members of other groups emerges as an
implication of a broader “sociofunctional” approach we have been
developing to better account for a range of intragroup and inter-
group phenomena (e.g., Neuberg, Smith, & Asher, 2000).
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To anticipate our argument, we suggest that the specific feelings
people have toward members of other groups should depend on the
specific tangible threats they see these other groups as posing:
From qualitatively different threats should emerge qualitatively
different, and functionally relevant, emotions. From this perspec-
tive, the concept of prejudice as general attitude is inherently
problematic: Because the traditional prejudice construct aggre-
1 In previous writings and presentations (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2003;
Neuberg & Cottrell, 2002) we have described this framework as biocul-
tural. We have changed our labeling of these ideas to sociofunctional to
better capture our focus on the functional psychological mechanisms that
promote effective and successful social living. Note that this is merely a
change in label and not in the content of our approach.
We offer special thanks to Terrilee Asher and the members of the Friday
afternoon research seminar for their contributions to the early development
of these ideas, and to Eliot Smith, Jon Maner, Aaron Taylor, and Amy
Cuddy for their helpful suggestions and comments on previous versions of
this article.
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770gates across qualitatively different emotional reactions (e.g., anger,
fear, disgust, pity, admiration, guilt)—each with its often distinct
eliciting conditions, phenomenologies, facial expressions, neuro-
logic structures, physiological patterns, and correlated behavioral
propensities—it may obscure the rich texturing of emotional reac-
tions people have toward different groups. Consequently, an ex-
clusive focus on this traditional conceptualization of prejudice is
likely to hinder the development of effective theory and practical
intervention.
A Sociofunctional Approach
By their nature, people are group-living animals. According to
many anthropologists, environmental challenges present in our
evolutionary past propelled ancestral humans toward life in highly
interdependent and cooperative groups (e.g., Leakey & Lewin,
1977). This “ultrasociality” (Campbell, 1982), “hypersociality”
(Richerson & Boyd, 1995), or “obligatory interdependence”
(Brewer, 2001) likely evolved as a means to maximize individual
success: An individual was presumably able to gain more essential
resources (e.g., food, water, shelter, mates) and achieve more
important goals (e.g., child rearing, self-protection) by living and
working with other individuals in the context of a group compared
with living and working by oneself. Interdependent group living,
then, can be seen as an adaptation—perhaps the most important
adaptation (Barchas, 1986; Brewer, 1997; Brewer & Caporael,
1990; Leakey, 1978)—“designed” to protect the human individual
from the environment’s many dangers while also supporting the
effective exploitation of the environment’s many opportunities.
2
Group life has its costs, however (e.g., R. D. Alexander, 1974;
Dunbar, 1988). For instance, group living surrounds one with
individuals able to physically harm fellow group members, to
spread contagious disease, or to “free ride” on their efforts. A
commitment to sociality thus carries a risk: If threats such as these
are left unchecked, the costs of sociality will quickly exceed its
benefits. Thus, to maximize the returns on group living, individual
group members should be attuned to others’ features or behaviors
that characterize them as potential threats.
We note two distinct levels at which group members may
threaten each other. The benefits of group living depend not
merely on the presence of others but on the effective coordination
of these individuals into a well-functioning group. Individual
group members should thus be attuned not only to those features
and behaviors of others that heuristically characterize them as
direct threats to one’s personal success but also to those features
and behaviors of others that heuristically characterize them as
threats to group success, which are our focus here. This latter
sensitivity to group-directed threats should be especially acute for
those highly invested in, and dependent on, their groups.
What events signal to individuals that the functioning of their
group may be compromised? Because groups enhance individual
success by providing members with valuable resources, members
should be attuned to potential threats to group-level resources such
as territory, physical security, property, economic standing, and
the like. They should also be attuned to those group structures and
processes that support the group’s operational integrity—to those
structures and processes that encourage effective and efficient
group operations. Effective groups tend to possess strong norms of
reciprocity, trust among members, systems of effective communi-
cation, authority structures for organizing individual effort and
distributing group resources, common values, mechanisms for
effectively educating and socializing members, members with
strong in-group social identities, and the like (e.g., Brown, 1991).
Individual group members should thus be especially attuned to
potential threats to reciprocity (because others are either unwilling
or unable to reciprocate), trust, value systems, socialization pro-
cesses, authority structures, and so on (Neuberg et al., 2000).
Finally, mere attunement to threats cannot be enough: Vigilance
must be accompanied by psychological responses that function to
minimize—or even eliminate—recognized threats and their detri-
mental effects.
In sum, the sociofunctional approach is based on three simple,
but fundamental, propositions: (a) Humans evolved as highly
interdependent social beings; (b) effectively functioning groups
tend to possess particular social structures and processes; and (c)
individuals possess psychological mechanisms “designed” by bi-
ological and cultural evolution to take advantage of the opportu-
nities provided by group living and to protect themselves from
threats to group living. Ongoing research has used this approach to
successfully predict the traits people most value for members of
different social groups and the impressions of themselves they
most want to present to others, to generate hypotheses regarding
the nature of gossip and other forms of communicated social
information, and to motivate explorations of similarities in formal
systems of social control across religious and criminal justice
systems (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2004; Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li,
2003; Neuberg & Story, 2003). Here we use the sociofunctional
approach, in conjunction with theory and empirical findings on the
goal-relevance of discrete emotions, to generate specific predic-
tions about the threat-driven nature of intergroup affect.
The Goal Relevance of Discrete Emotions
Emotions are critical to the natural goal-seeking process. They
signal the presence of circumstances that threaten or profit impor-
tant goals (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1990; Ekman & Davidson,
1994; Higgins, 1987; Simon, 1967) and direct and energize be-
havior toward the remediation of such threats or the exploitation of
such benefits (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Ekman, 1999;
Nesse, 1990; Plutchik, 1980, 2003; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990).
Emotions organize and coordinate ongoing psychological action
(e.g., attention, motivation, memory, behavioral inclinations) so
that people might respond more effectively to events related to
individual survival and success.
2 We are not suggesting that human sociality emerged because it benefits
the survival of the group (i.e., a group selection process; see Sober &
Wilson, 1998; Wilson & Sober, 1994), but rather because it benefits the
overall fitness of the individual. Moreover, our evolution-based arguments
should not be interpreted as deterministic (nor, for that matter, should any
evolution-based argument); the social processes we propose to understand
intergroup affect are far from invariable and inevitable. Indeed, these
processes, once explicated, lend themselves nicely to effective practical
interventions to reduce the maltreatment of groups and people around the
globe (for further discussion, see Schaller & Neuberg, 2004). Finally, just
because we believe that an evolution-inspired analysis shines light on
certain unique complexities of intergroup affect does not in any way imply
that the psychological processes and outcomes revealed by our analysis are
morally, ethically, or legally justifiable.
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ferent events evoke different emotions. A shadowy figure quickly
emerging from a dark alley—a problem related to personal secu-
rity—elicits fear, whereas the theft of one’s car—a problem re-
lated to personal resources—elicits anger. Moreover, distinct emo-
tions are affiliated with specific physiological, cognitive, and
behavioral tendencies, all of which operate to facilitate resolution
of the problem. For example, the fear felt toward the unfamiliar
figure triggers psychological and physical activity aimed at pro-
moting escape from the potentially threatening situation, whereas
the anger felt toward the property thief triggers activity aimed at
promoting retrieval of the lost goods.
Emotions researchers have theorized about the perceived stim-
ulus event classes that elicit qualitatively distinct emotions and
action tendencies (e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Frijda, 1986;
Izard, 1991; Lazarus, 1991; Nesse, 1990; Plutchik, 1980) and have
arrived at some consensus. Table 1 highlights the links among
perceived stimulus event classes, discrete emotions, action tenden-
cies, and resulting functional outcomes for an illustrative set of
emotions. For example, perceiving the obstruction of valuable
goals or the taking of valuable resources produces anger and a
tendency to aggress, perceiving physical or moral contamination
produces disgust and a tendency to expel the contaminated object
or idea, and perceiving a threat to physical safety produces fear and
a tendency to flee. These first three emotions—anger, disgust, and
fear—are often considered basic emotions, shaped by natural se-
lection to automatically address recurrent survival-related prob-
lems (Ekman, 1999).
Pity, envy, and guilt, on the other hand, involve more complex
cognitive appraisals of social situations. These emotional reactions
nonetheless progress the individual toward important adaptive
outcomes. Pity (as part of the sympathy family of emotions) is
hypothesized to be an important emotional response involved in
the regulation of the human altruistic system (Trivers, 1971),
because it may motivate prosocial behavior toward others who are
temporarily disadvantaged for reasons beyond their control,
thereby generating gratitude from the recipient and subsequent
reciprocity of the assistance back to the helper in the future. Envy
results from feelings of being deprived of valuable resources
possessed by another and produces a tendency to obtain the desired
objects (Lazarus, 1991; Parrott, 1991), thereby encouraging indi-
viduals to pursue limited important resources. Guilt is produced by
the belief that one has engaged in a moral transgression that has
harmed another (especially a perceived in-group member) and
elicits an inclination toward reconciliatory behavior (Lazarus,
1991). Like pity, guilt may also be important to the maintenance of
reciprocal relations: Guilt may motivate the wrongdoer to com-
pensate for the harm caused and to follow appropriate rules of
reciprocal exchange in the future (Trivers, 1971).
From Group-Relevant Threats to Discrete Emotions
The more basic, “lower brain” emotions did not evolve for the
purpose of helping humans manage the threats and opportunities of
sociality. Although one must be wary of attributing emotional
states to other animals, fear, anger, and disgust, for example,
appear to exist in creatures with an evolutionary history much
longer than humans’ and in species that are barely social (e.g.,
Izard, 1978; O ¨hman, 1993; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 1993).
Evolution, however, often exploits existing adaptations for other
purposes. For example, the infant attachment system may have
been co-opted by natural selection to encourage romantic attach-
ment between mates and thus enhance the survival and success of
offspring (Shaver, Hazan, & Bradshaw, 1988). Because humans
have long been ultrasocial, these valuable emotion-based psycho-
logical mechanisms likely became used by natural selection for the
additional purpose of helping people protect valuable group re-
sources and maintain the integrity of critical social structures and
processes. Just as the theft of an individual’s property will evoke
anger, so too should the theft of a group’s property—particularly
among those group members highly invested in and dependent on
the group.
Other emotions, in contrast, may have indeed evolved to help
social animals manage the complexities of the repeated, relatively
stable interdependence that characterizes social life. For instance,
unlike fear, anger, and disgust, the emotions of pity, guilt, empa-
thy, embarrassment, and shame are inherently social and have as
cognitive antecedents relatively complex appraisals that explicitly
Table 1
An Evolutionary Approach to Emotions
Perceived stimulus event classes
Discrete
emotion Action tendency Adaptive outcome
Obstacles and barriers to desired
outcomes
Anger Aggression Destruction/removal of obstacle; reacquisition of
desired outcome
Contamination by unpalatable object
or idea
Disgust Active avoidance or rejection of
object or idea
Removal of repulsive stimulus
Immediate threat to physical safety Fear Escape Safety
Other distressed because of
uncontrollable conditions
Pity Prosocial behavior Remediation of other’s distress; creation of obligation
in a potential ally
Other possesses desired object or
opportunity that the perceiver lacks
Envy Attempt to seize desired
resources from other
Pursuit of limited valuable resources
Other distressed because of actions of
the perceiver
Guilt Reconciliatory behavior Restoration of relationship with victimized individual;
restoration of self-concept as moral person
Note. Illustrative examples of stimulus event classes and their associated emotional reactions, behavioral reactions, and adaptive outcomes as distilled
from the work of Plutchik, Nesse, Ekman, Lazarus, Frijda, and others. From From Prejudice to Intergroup Relations: Differentiated Reactions to Social
Groups (p. 270), by D. M. Mackie & E. R. Smith (Eds.), 2002. New York: Psychology Press. Copyright 2002 by Psychology Press. Adapted with
permission.
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Although these emotions likely evolved in the service of managing
dyadic social relations, they too may have been easily exploited by
natural selection for the additional purpose of managing group and
intergroup relations.
Because human sociality developed to help individuals gain
important tangible resources (e.g., food, shelter, mates), we expect
individuals to be most attuned to threats to in-group success when
there are tangible outcomes at stake. These emotion-based psy-
chological systems should therefore operate most powerfully
within interactions between groups perceived to be mutually in-
terdependent, that is, cooperating or competing to obtain valued
tangible outcomes (e.g., as in interactions between White and
Black Americans). These threat–emotion systems may operate
less prominently within interactions between groups defined pri-
marily by divergent identities alone (e.g., interactions between
Honda and Toyota owners).
Integrating, then, the emotions research summarized in Table 1
and our understanding of the fundamental structures and processes
underlying effective group operation, we have generated explicit
predictions regarding the links between specific threats to the
effective functioning of groups (and the more general classes of
threat they represent) and the specific emotions they evoke; we
present the predictions emerging from this threat-based appraisal
framework in Table 2.
Anger is elicited when people confront obstacles and barriers to
their desired outcomes, suggesting that intergroup anger is likely to
occur when an out-group is seen to gain in-group economic re-
sources (e.g., jobs), seize or damage in-group physical property
(e.g., homes), diminish the freedoms and rights provided to in-
group members, choose not to fulfill reciprocal relations with the
in-group, interfere with established in-group norms and social
coordination, or betray the in-group’s trust. As indicated in Table
2, this anger may then spur individuals to engage in functionally
appropriate aggressive behaviors aimed at removing the specific
perceived obstacle. Moreover, because all intergroup threats, in the
most basic sense, obstruct a desired outcome (e.g., physical safety,
good health, rewarding reciprocal relations), we hypothesize that
anger may be a secondary emotional reaction to an out-group
perceived to carry a contagious physical illness, promote values
opposing those of the in-group, endanger the in-group’s physical
safety, neglect a reciprocity-based relationship because of inabil-
ity, or threaten the in-group’s moral standing. Whether immediate
or subsequent, then, we suggest that anger will accompany nearly
all perceptions of out-group threat (Neuberg & Cottrell, 2002).
Disgust is elicited when people encounter a physical or moral
contaminant, suggesting that intergroup disgust is likely to occur
when an out-group is thought to carry a contagious and harmful
physical illness or when an out-group promotes values and ideals
that oppose those of the in-group. This disgust may then motivate
qualitatively distinct actions aimed at minimizing the physical or
moral contamination. Because threats to personal freedoms and
reciprocity relations (by choice) imply that an out-group may
promote values that oppose those of the in-group, we hypothesize
that disgust may be a secondary emotional reaction to an out-group
seen to intentionally limit the in-group’s personal freedoms or
violate the rules of reciprocal exchange.
Fear (and its associated tendencies toward self-protective be-
havior) should predominate when others are perceived to threaten
the group’s physical safety. We furthermore hypothesize that fear
may be a secondary emotional reaction to an out-group perceived
to obtain in-group economic resources, seize or damage in-group
property, interfere with in-group social coordination, or betray
trust relations with the in-group, because each of these obstacle
threats signals potential uncertainty for future well-being. Because
physical and moral contamination may also heighten insecurity
Table 2
Hypothesized Theoretical Connections Between Perceived Threats to the In-Group and Elicited Primary and Secondary Emotions
Primary emotional
reaction Eliciting threat perceptions Associated motivations
Secondary emotional
reactions
Anger Obstacles to in-group: Remove obstacles:
Threat to group economic resources Reclaim economic control Envy, fear
Threat to group property Reclaim or secure property Fear
Threat to personal freedoms and rights of group
members
Protect/reclaim compromised liberties Disgust
Threat to reciprocity relations (by choice) Obtain object or effort not properly exchanged Disgust
Threat to social coordination Restore effective group functioning Fear
Threat to trust relations Minimize damage caused by violation Fear
Disgust Contamination to in-group: Minimize contamination:
Threat to group health via contagion Prevent harmful diseases Fear, pity, anger
Threat to group values Maintain and confirm value system Anger, fear
Fear Endangered group physical safety Protect self and valued others Anger
Pity Threat to reciprocity relations (because of
inability)
Return to a proper exchange relationship Anger/resentment
Guilt Threat to perception of in-group’s morality Confirm standing as a moral group Anger
Note. Secondary emotions arise when the eliciting threat perception implies the likely presence of a second threat (e.g., when a threat to reciprocity [by
choice] also implies a morality violation). From From Prejudice to Intergroup Relations: Differentiated Reactions to Social Groups (p. 272), by D. M.
Mackie & E. R. Smith (Eds.), 2002. New York: Psychology Press. Copyright 2002 by Psychology Press. Adapted with permission.
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ceptible individuals), fear may also be elicited secondarily by
perceived threats to group health or group values.
Pity should predominate when others, particularly those poten-
tially existing within an extended in-group, are distressed because
they are unable to maintain a reciprocity-based relationship for
reasons outside their control (i.e., inability); this may impel proso-
cial behavior focused on increasing the likelihood that others may
be able to meet reciprocity-based obligations in the future. In
addition, pity may occur as a secondary emotional reaction to a
perceived threat to group health if the diseased others are not held
responsible for contracting or passing along their affliction (e.g.,
Dijker, Kok, & Koomen, 1996; Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson,
1988).
Guilt should predominate when an out-group, suffering because
of actions of the perceiver’s group, is believed to threaten the
moral standing of the perceiver’s group. After committing such
image-damaging moral transgressions, individuals may then be-
have in ways to validate the in-group’s position as good and moral
(e.g., Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002; Lickel, Schmader,
& Barquissau, 2004). Finally, envy should occur as a secondary
emotional reaction to others who acquire the in-group’s economic
resources, because these others now possess a desirable object or
opportunity that the in-group lacks.
Hypotheses
From the above considerations we have derived five general
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Different groups can evoke qualitatively dif-
ferent profiles of emotional reactions.
To the extent that different groups can be seen to pose different
patterns of threats—see below—they should evoke different pro-
files of emotional reactions.
3
Hypothesis 2: Measures of prejudice as traditionally con-
ceived will often mask the variation across groups in evoked
emotion profiles.
Because of its conceptualization as a general attitude or evalu-
ation, the traditional measurement of prejudice can obscure the
qualitatively distinct emotional responses people have to different
groups. This hypothesis will be supported if different groups elicit
similar levels of general prejudice but distinct emotion profiles.
Hypothesis 3: Different groups can evoke qualitatively dif-
ferent profiles of perceived threats.
Different groups may be perceived to threaten group-level re-
sources and group integrity in different, and multiple, ways: Some
may seize our territory and advocate values and principles incom-
patible with those we cherish; others may carry infectious diseases
and fail to contribute their share to the common good. Such groups
should elicit distinct threat profiles.
Hypothesis 4: General measures of perceived threat will often
mask the variation across groups in evoked threat profiles.
Just as general measures of prejudice may obscure differentiated
emotional reactions to groups, general measures of perceived
threat may conceal differentiated threats ostensibly posed by dif-
ferent groups. This hypothesis will be supported if different groups
elicit similar levels of general threat but distinct threat profiles.
Hypothesis 5: Profiles of the specific threats posed by differ-
ent groups will reliably and systematically predict the emo-
tion profiles evoked by these groups.
If our analysis is correct, profiles of emotional reactions should
emerge naturally from profiles of threat perceptions, as articulated
in Table 2. This hypothesis will be supported if we can demon-
strate a systematic link between the observed threat and emotion
profiles.
Other Contemporary Emotion- and Threat-Based
Approaches to Prejudice
We are not alone in recognizing the importance of moving
beyond the traditional view of prejudice as a general attitude (for
a review, see Mackie & Smith, 2002). Moreover, others have
explicitly explored the concept of intergroup threat to tangible
resources (e.g., LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1966; Stephan
& Renfro, 2002). We briefly review these alternative approaches
to clarify important points of overlap with our sociofunctional
approach as well as to highlight some of the unique contributions
made by the current research.
Esses and her colleagues (Esses & Dovidio, 2002; Esses, Had-
dock, & Zanna, 1993; Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993) have
assessed the discrete emotional reactions (e.g., fear, anger, dis-
gust), stereotypes (e.g., friendly, lazy), symbolic beliefs (e.g.,
“promote religious values,” “block family values”), and general
attitudes (i.e., prejudice) associated with assorted ethnic and social
groups (e.g., French Canadians, Blacks, homosexuals). To explore
the associations among these constructs for each group, these
researchers combined the valence and frequency of each reaction
to create a single, aggregate indicator for each construct. Although
an appropriate strategy given their theoretical interests, such ag-
gregations precluded the possibility of assessing within their sam-
ples whether prejudice (as a general attitude) obscured the pres-
ence of differing emotion profiles for their different target groups
and whether aggregated symbolic beliefs (constituting, perhaps,
one form of threat) obscured the presence of differing symbolic
threat profiles for their different target groups. Thus, although their
data are potentially useful for exploring Hypotheses 1 and 2, in
particular, and Hypotheses 3–5 to a substantially lesser extent,
their analyses do not provide such tests.
In an examination of prejudice against ethnic out-groups, Dijker
and his colleagues (Dijker, 1987; Dijker, Koomen, van den Heu-
vel, & Frijda, 1996) assessed the emotional reactions native Dutch
people experience toward different ethnic minorities (e.g., Suri-
namese, Turkish, and Moroccan immigrants). They, too, aggre-
gated over discrete emotions to create, on the basis of exploratory
3 Groups sometimes provide each other with opportunities as well as
threats. However, in light of the great bulk of existing prejudice and
intergroup relations research, we focus in this article on patterns of threats
and related discrete emotions.
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irritation, concern). Despite this partial aggregation—and the dif-
ficulty it causes for rigorously testing Hypothesis 1—their findings
nonetheless suggest the importance of considering specific emo-
tions when exploring intergroup affect (e.g., Surinamese, but not
Turks or Moroccans, evoked anxiety). Moreover, their data also
suggest that certain threats may be more strongly associated with
some emotional responses than others (e.g., the perception of
danger was associated with anxiety more often than with irritation
or worry), a finding consistent with Hypothesis 5. Thus, although
far from a systematic and thorough test of our hypotheses, Dijker
and colleagues’ findings do lend them some support.
The stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 2002; Fiske, Xu,
Cuddy, & Glick, 1999) posits that people experience distinct
emotions toward groups perceived to differ on the dimensions of
warmth and competence—pity toward high-warmth but low-
competence groups, envy toward low-warmth but high-
competence groups, admiration toward high-warmth and high-
competence groups, and contempt toward low-warmth and low-
competence groups. With respect to numerous ethnic, political,
religious, and social groups within America, these researchers did
indeed observe the predicted differentiated emotional reactions to
groups, consistent with Hypothesis 1. We note, however, that (a)
their four emotion clusters aggregate across emotions typically
believed to be discrete (e.g., anger and disgust are both in the
cluster labeled “contempt”), (b) other fundamental emotions (for
example, fear) were never analyzed because they failed to fit
cleanly into one of these four empirically driven clusters, and (c)
the categorical nature of their framework (and accompanying
analysis strategy) does not suggest the conceptual possibility that
different groups elicit multiple emotions in different configura-
tions (i.e., emotion profiles). As a consequence, the findings from
this approach likely underestimate the diversity of emotional re-
actions people have to different groups; we present evidence
suggesting this very point below. Moreover, the aims of these
researchers were different than ours, and so we are not able to use
their data to test our Hypotheses 2–5.
Intergroup emotions theory (IET; Devos, Silver, Mackie, &
Smith, 2002; E. R. Smith, 1993, 1999; Mackie et al., 2000) arises
from the melding of social identity and self-categorization theo-
ries, on the one hand, with appraisal theories of emotions, on the
other. As with our approach, IET posits that people experience a
diversity of discrete intergroup emotions toward different groups.
In particular, when social identities are salient, individuals inter-
pret situations in terms of harm or benefit for one’s own group and
experience specific emotions as suggested by assorted appraisal
theories of emotion (they cite Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 1984;
Scherer, 1988; C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). The predictions
generated from IET will overlap with the predictions derived from
our own framework to the extent that it uses a similar, functionally
grounded theory of discrete emotions (which it appears to do) and
a similar threat-based appraisal system (which is unclear); indeed,
we suspect that the five hypotheses proposed here would be seen
by IET proponents as consistent with that approach. Empirically,
however, E. R. Smith, Mackie, and their colleagues (Devos, Silver,
Mackie, & Smith, 2002; E. R. Smith, 1993, 1999; Mackie et al.,
2000) have limited their explorations to the emotions of anger
and fear, within the context of having experimental participants
imagine interacting with groups designed to differ in the
strength of threat they posed to participant in-groups (e.g.,
individuals valuing social order vs. freedom; fellow students at
one’s university). To this point, then, the data generated by IET
researchers do not test our Hypotheses 1–4 and provide only a
partial test of Hypothesis 5.
According to image theory (M. G. Alexander, Brewer, & Herr-
mann, 1999; Brewer & Alexander, 2002), specific configurations
of appraisals on the dimensions of intergroup competition, power,
and status give rise to differentiated emotional reactions (e.g.,
anger, fear, envy), cognitive images (e.g., out-group as enemy,
barbarian, or imperialist), and action tendencies (e.g., attack, de-
fend, rebel). This perspective is compatible with ours in its aim to
link specific threats to specific emotions, although image theory
focuses more on the sociostructural relations from which different
threats and opportunities emerge, whereas we focus more on
particular threats and opportunities per se. Recent empirical work
examining relations among White and Black American high
school students supports the image theory notion that differenti-
ated emotional reactions are indeed associated with different out-
group images (Brewer & Alexander, 2002). The findings of these
researchers are thus compatible with our Hypotheses 1, 3, and 5,
although we note that their categorical scheme, like that of stereo-
type content theory, does not straightforwardly account for the
possibility that different groups elicit multiple emotions in differ-
ent configurations (i.e., that they may elicit different emotion
profiles).
Finally, the revised integrated threat theory (Stephan & Renfro,
2002) emphasizes the importance of threat for understanding prej-
udice. Revised integrated threat theory posits that four umbrella
categories of constructs—realistic threats to the in-group, symbolic
threats to the in-group, realistic threats to the individual, and
symbolic threats to the individual—cause negative psychological
(e.g., prejudice) and behavioral (e.g., aggression) reactions to
groups thought to pose such threats. This perspective focuses on a
relatively small number of tangible threats, however, and like
realistic conflict theories before it (e.g., LeVine & Campbell,
1972; Sherif, 1966) makes no claims as to how different specific
threats would elicit distinct, specific emotions. Thus, the data
generated by this approach are potentially relevant only to our
Hypothesis 3.
Thus, although there exist clear points of convergence between
our sociofunctional approach and these other perspectives, the
points of divergence are also significant; we further compare the
alternative approaches below. Moreover, note that none of the
empirical work emerging from these approaches has explicitly
tested Hypotheses 2 and 4—that general measures of prejudice
and threat may actually mask across-group differences in emotion
and threat profiles—or has tested Hypotheses 3 and 5 in a com-
prehensive manner.
To test our hypotheses and to provide a uniquely rich data set
useful for beginning the process of empirically differentiating
among approaches, we presented participants with an assortment
of ethnic, religious, and ideological groups within the United
States and inquired about (a) the specific emotional reactions they
have toward these groups, (b) the general feeling (i.e., prejudice)
they have toward these groups, (c) the specific threats they per-
ceive these groups as posing, and (d) the general threat they
perceive these groups as posing. We predicted that different groups
would elicit different profiles of discrete emotions and threats
775 A SOCIOFUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO INTERGROUP AFFECT(Hypotheses 1 and 3); that differentiations among these emotion
and threat profiles would often be effectively masked by simple
valence-based measures of prejudice and threat (Hypotheses 2 and
4); and that there would be systematic, functional links between
specific threats and specific emotions, as articulated in Table 2
(Hypothesis 5).
Method
Participants
Two hundred thirty-five European American undergraduate students
participated. They were, on average, 20.60 years old (SD  3.53), pre-
dominantly female (63%), and self-identified as mainstream Christian
(51%). The majority (64%) were recruited from upper division psychology
classes and received extra credit in exchange for their participation. The
remainder were recruited from the introductory psychology subject pool
and received required course credit in exchange for their participation.
Procedure
Participants from upper division psychology courses completed the
questionnaire packets out of the classroom, on their own time. Question-
naire packets were distributed to the introductory psychology participants
in small groups in the laboratory; they completed the items at their own
pace. Presentation of the affective response and threat perception items for
each group was counterbalanced across all participants.
Presented in one of 10 random orders, participants rated a set of nine
groups: activist feminists, African Americans, Asian Americans, European
Americans, fundamentalist Christians, gay men, Mexican Americans, Na-
tive Americans, and nonfundamentalist Christians. Because we expected
few threats and little threat-related emotion to be associated with one’s own
groups, the participants’ ethnic in-group (European Americans) and modal
religious in-group (nonfundamentalist Christians) were included to serve as
baselines for comparison with the other groups. We selected the additional
target groups because (a) our European American participants in the
American Southwest likely perceive themselves to be involved with these
groups in mutually interdependent relationships involving tangible out-
comes, and (b) common stereotypes suggest that these groups might be
seen to pose a range of different threats—a requirement if we were to
appropriately test our hypotheses. To wit, we suspected that activist fem-
inists, fundamentalist Christians, and gay men would be seen as threatening
the values and personal freedoms of our student sample and in somewhat
different ways; that gay men would be seen as posing a threat to health (via
a perceived association with HIV/AIDS); that Asian Americans would be
seen as posing an economic threat; that African Americans and Mexican
Americans would be viewed as posing physical safety, property, and
reciprocity (by choice and inability) threats; and that Native Americans
would be viewed as posing threats to reciprocity (by inability). Note that
the test of our hypotheses does not depend on whether we are correct in the
above presumptions of which groups are associated with particular threats.
Indeed, we could be entirely wrong in the threats we expect each group to
pose but receive perfect support for our hypotheses—if the emotions
elicited by a group are those that map as predicted onto the threats that
group is actually perceived by our participants to pose. However, we were
confident—on the basis of past research (e.g., Cottrell, Neuberg, & Asher,
2004; Devine & Elliot, 1995; Esses & Dovidio, 2002; Haddock et al., 1993;
Haddock & Zanna, 1994; Hurh & Kim, 1989; Yee, 1992)—that the
collection of groups selected would provide enough variation in perceived
threats to enable an adequate test of our hypotheses.
Measures
Affective Reactions
To assess affective responses to the selected groups, participants re-
ported the extent to which they experienced each feeling when thinking
about a particular group and its members (1  Not at all,9 Extremely).
To assess overall positive evaluation, participants reported the degree to
which they liked and felt positive toward each group; to assess overall
negative evaluation, participants reported the extent to which they disliked
and felt negative toward each group. In addition, we measured 13 emo-
tional reactions with two items each. Some of these emotions were selected
because of their straightforward relevance to our theory (see Table 2)—
anger, disgust, fear, pity, envy, and guilt—or because they were longer
lasting but less intense instantiations of these (i.e., resentment, anxiety).
Others were included merely to provide participants with a broader emo-
tional judgment context (i.e., respect, happiness, hurt, sadness, pride,
security, and sympathy). All participants completed these affective re-
sponse items in the same random order for all groups.
Threat Perceptions
To assess perceived threats associated with the selected groups, partic-
ipants indicated the extent to which they agreed with statements regarding
the general and specific threats that each group poses to American citizens
and society (1  Strongly Disagree,9 Strongly Agree). To assess
general threat, participants reported the extent to which each group was
dangerous and posed a threat to American citizens. To assess specific
threats relevant to our sociofunctional approach (see Table 2), participants
reported the extent to which they believed the target group threatened jobs
and economic opportunities, threatened personal possessions, threatened
personal rights and freedoms, violated reciprocity relations by choice,
threatened social coordination and functioning, violated trust, threatened
physical health, held values inconsistent with those of the in-group, en-
dangered physical safety, and violated reciprocity relations because of a
lack of ability.
4 Two items were included to measure each of these 10
threats. All participants completed the 2 general threat items followed by
the 20 specific threat items in a random arrangement.
Results
Composite Scores and Difference Scores
As described, all participants completed two items designed to
assess each emotion and threat construct. These a priori item pairs
correlated highly with one another (all rs  .70), and so we
averaged them to create composite scores for each general and
specific affective response and for each general and specific threat
perceived. Although it is not uncommon for researchers to further
aggregate such data on the basis of exploratory factor analyses, we
have chosen not to do so on technical and theoretical grounds.
Technically, because exploratory factor analysis is a data-driven
approach, it runs the risk of capitalizing on chance characteristics
in the data and creating unstable and incoherent factor solutions
(Conway & Huffcutt, 2003; Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, &
4 In exploratory fashion, we included items designed to assess threats
that groups may pose to one’s own group’s moral standing in the hope that
they would uniquely predict feelings of guilt. Unfortunately, we worded
the items poorly, and the composite appears instead to capture a more
general sense of threat. We thus exclude this composite from all analyses
to follow but note that including it alters neither our findings nor our
conclusions.
776 COTTRELL AND NEUBERGStrahan, 1999). Theoretically, we believe that the individual threat
measures—though correlated with one other—assess distinct cat-
egories of threat: Stealing a person’s car is not the same as making
the person ill or assaulting him or her with a weapon. On similar
grounds, as many emotions researchers have emphasized, it is
necessary to maintain firm empirical distinctions among our mea-
sured emotions: Feeling angry is not the same as feeling disgusted
or feeling afraid. Indeed, growing evidence demonstrates that
unique universal signals, nervous system responses, and anteced-
ent events differentiate the basic emotions (e.g., anger, disgust,
fear; Ekman, 1999). This decision to maintain firm distinctions
among our threat and emotion constructs is supported by confir-
matory factor analyses (CFAs).
5 Moreover, if we are incorrect in
our belief that these threats and emotions are distinct from one
another—if, for example, anger, disgust, and fear functioned iden-
tically for our participants—then the predicted textured patterning
of perceived threats and emotional patterns would not emerge, and
our hypotheses would be disconfirmed.
As noted above, our focus is on the potential patterning of
threat-related emotions. These reactions better describe the inter-
group interactions of interest, and focusing our report on them
greatly streamlines the presentation of a large amount of data. We
thus created emotion composite scores for the emotion constructs
most relevant to our theoretical approach: anger/resentment, dis-
gust, fear/anxiety, pity, and envy.
6 To create a measure of overall
negative prejudice, we subtracted the positive evaluation compos-
ite score for each group from the negative evaluation composite
score for that group; higher values on this overall prejudice mea-
sure indicate more negative prejudice toward the group.
To test Hypotheses 1–4, we used each participant’s affect and
threat ratings of European Americans as a baseline for comparison
against their ratings of the other groups. Thus, we created and
analyzed difference scores for each affect and threat by subtracting
each participant’s affect and threat rating for European Americans
from his or her affect and threat rating for each other group. The
ratings reported below thus reflect mean difference scores (relative
to European Americans) for all participants in our sample. Because
all participants were European American, this approach serves to
eliminate idiosyncratic differences in participants’ tendencies to
perceive particular threats and to experience particular emotions
and greatly aids with the visual identification and interpretation of
affect and threat patterns. Note that our conclusions regarding
Hypotheses 1–4 remain unchanged if we instead analyze raw (i.e.,
nondifference) scores.
Tests of Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Different Groups Can Evoke Qualitatively
Different Profiles of Emotional Reactions
We conducted a two-way (Target Group  Emotion Experi-
enced) repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the
mean difference emotion ratings; a significant Target Group 
Emotion Experienced interaction would reveal that the emotion
profiles do indeed differ across groups. As predicted, this interac-
tion emerged as highly statistically significant, F(28, 6384) 
31.03, p  .00001, partial 
2  .120; Table 3 presents the means
and standard deviations for all emotion ratings for all groups.
These data provide substantial support for Hypothesis 1. People
may indeed report different patterns of emotional experience to-
5 For each target group, a chi-square difference test revealed that our a
priori 10-factor threat model (10 specific threat factors, each represented by
an item pair) demonstrated a good fit to the data (as shown by comparative
fit index [CFI], root-mean-square error of approximation [RMSEA], and
standardized root-mean-square residual [SRMR] values) and fit the data
significantly better than a 1-factor threat model (1 general threat factor,
represented by all threat items). Similar support was found for our emotion
model: Chi-square difference tests revealed that our a priori 5-factor
emotion model (anger, disgust, fear, pity, and envy factors, each repre-
sented by an item pair) demonstrated a good fit to the data (as shown by
CFI, RMSEA, and SRMR values) and fit the data significantly better than
a 1-factor emotion model (1 general emotion factor, represented by all
emotion items), again for all target groups. Because anger and disgust are
sometimes grouped together by exploratory factor analyses (as in research
by Fiske et al., 2002), we also compared the 5-factor emotion model with
a 4-factor emotion model that combined anger and disgust into 1 factor. For
seven of the nine target groups, a chi-square difference test revealed that
this 4-factor model fit the data significantly worse than the 5-factor model;
for the remaining two target groups, the 4-factor model fit worse than our
preferred 5-factor alternative, although not significantly so. In all, the
CFAs strongly validate our theory-based decisions to use measures of
relatively discrete threats and emotions.
6 Because of our unsuccessful attempt to generate a valid measure of
morality threat (see Footnote 4), we were unable to conduct our focal
threat–emotion analysis for this threat’s associated emotion (i.e., a test of
the proposed link between threat to in-group morality and guilt). As a result
of this failure to fully test our hypotheses related to guilt, we chose to
discard guilt from further analyses. Note that including the discarded items
in analyses does not alter any of our conclusions. These complete data are
available from the authors by request.
Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations of Emotional Reactions (Relative to European Americans)
Group
Anger/resentment Disgust Fear/anxiety Pity Envy Prejudice
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Activist feminists 0.89 2.02 1.01 2.21 0.24 1.50 0.55 1.62 0.22 1.40 3.38 4.56
African Americans 0.54 1.66 0.47 1.76 0.90 1.63 1.14 1.81 0.15 1.39 1.14 3.63
Asian Americans 0.16 1.39 0.01 1.44 0.05 1.05 0.22 1.12 0.01 1.34 0.89 3.31
Fundamentalist Christians 0.94 2.12 1.10 2.37 0.57 1.75 0.91 2.16 0.21 1.38 3.37 4.85
Gay men 0.62 2.06 1.84 2.92 0.08 1.56 1.60 2.46 0.56 1.31 2.78 4.80
Mexican Americans 0.87 1.99 0.97 2.12 0.86 1.64 1.21 1.88 0.39 1.22 2.49 4.03
Native Americans 0.25 1.52 0.25 1.68 0.04 1.08 2.18 2.41 0.13 1.44 0.76 3.48
Nonfundamentalist Christians 0.21 1.37 0.27 1.62 0.02 1.17 0.27 1.54 0.21 1.36 1.53 3.45
777 A SOCIOFUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO INTERGROUP AFFECTward different groups. For the purpose of more clearly illustrating
the diversity of emotional response to groups, we highlight par-
ticipants’ affective reactions to two subsets of groups in Figure 1
(African Americans, Asian Americans, and Native Americans) and
Figure 2 (activist feminists, fundamentalist Christians, and gay
men).
Hypothesis 2: Measures of Prejudice as Traditionally
Conceived Will Often Mask the Variation Across Groups
in Evoked Emotion Profiles
We have just seen that different groups can evoke different
patterns of discrete emotions. Hypothesis 2 would be supported if
groups that elicit distinct emotion profiles nonetheless elicit sim-
ilar levels of general prejudice. Such a finding would illustrate that
prejudice can mask meaningful patterns of underlying emotions.
Indeed, as seen in Table 3, many groups that differed from one
another in the emotion profiles they evoked also evoked compa-
rable degrees of general prejudice. We illustrate this general pat-
tern with the two subsets of groups presented in Figures 1 and 2.
As presented in Figure 1, African Americans, Asian Americans,
and Native Americans differed significantly in the emotion pro-
files they elicited in our participants. Moreover, they each evoked
general negative prejudice: Prejudice difference score for African
Americans  1.14, t(228)  4.74, p  .001; for Asian Americans,
difference  0.89, t(228)  4.06, p  .001; and for Native
Americans, difference  0.76, t(228)  3.32, p  .001. Finally,
supporting Hypothesis 2, the prejudice ratings for these three
groups did not significantly differ from one another, F(2, 456) 
1.42, p  .24, 
2  .006. Thus, although our participants ex-
pressed similar overall negativity toward African Americans,
Asian Americans, and Native Americans, they nonetheless re-
ported different discrete emotional reactions toward them. This
strongly suggests that measures of general prejudice can indeed
mask a rich diversity of discrete emotional reactions.
As presented in Figure 2, activist feminists, fundamentalist
Christians, and gay men also differed significantly in the patterns
of discrete emotions they elicited in our participants. Moreover,
they all elicited substantial amounts of negative prejudice: Preju-
dice difference scores for feminists  3.38, t(228)  11.20, p 
.001; for fundamentalist Christians, difference  3.37, t(228) 
10.51, p  .001; and for gay men, difference  2.78, t(228) 
8.75, p  .001. Yet here again, the prejudice ratings for these three
groups did not differ from one another, F(2, 456)  1.47, p 
.231, 
2  .006. This pattern, too, illustrates that measures of
overall prejudice can mask a notable diversity of discrete emo-
tional reactions.
Figure 1. Participants’ mean affective reactions to African Americans, Asian Americans, and Native Ameri-
cans, relative to affective reactions to European Americans. A repeated-measures analysis of variance on the
emotion ratings for these three groups revealed a significant Target Group  Emotion Experienced interaction,
F(8, 1824)  50.63, p  .00001, partial 
2  .182, supporting Hypothesis 1: Participants reported different
patterns of emotional reactions to these different groups.
778 COTTRELL AND NEUBERGHypothesis 3: Different Groups Can Evoke Qualitatively
Different Profiles of Perceived Threats
We performed a two-way (Target Group  Threat Perceived)
repeated-measures ANOVA on the mean difference threat ratings;
a significant Target Group  Threat Perceived interaction would
reveal that different groups can indeed be viewed as posing dif-
ferent profiles of threat. As predicted, this interaction emerged as
a significant effect, F(63, 14427)  46.15, p  .00001, partial

2  .168; Table 4 presents the means and standard deviations for
all threat ratings for all groups. These patterns of perceived threats
provide substantial support for Hypothesis 3: People may indeed
perceive different patterns of specific threats from different
groups. For the purpose of more clearly illustrating this effect, we
present in Figure 3 the patterns of threats people perceived from
activist feminists, African Americans, and fundamentalist
Christians.
Hypothesis 4: General Measures of Threat Will Often
Mask the Variation Across Groups in Evoked Threat
Profiles
Our participants often believed that different groups threatened
America in different ways. Hypothesis 4 would be supported if
groups that evoked distinct threat profiles nonetheless evoked
similar levels of general threat. Indeed, as seen in Table 4, many
groups that differed from one another in the profiles of specific
threats ostensibly posed also evoked similar perceptions of general
threat. We illustrate this general pattern with the subset of groups
presented in Figure 3.
As presented in Figure 3, our participants viewed African Amer-
icans, activist feminists, and fundamentalist Christians as posing
significantly different profiles of threat. Moreover, these groups
are all viewed as generally threatening—the scores all differ from
the European American baseline. For the general threat posed by
African Americans, difference  0.87, t(229)  7.27, p  .001;
for activist feminists, difference  0.76, t(229)  5.87, p  .001;
and for fundamentalist Christians, difference  0.85, t(229) 
5.85, p  .001. Finally, supporting Hypothesis 4, the general threat
ratings for these groups do not differ from one another, F(2,
458)  0.24, p  .789, 
2  .001. Thus, just as a focus on general
prejudice can mask an interesting and rich diversity of functionally
important emotions evoked by groups, a focus on general threat
can mask an interesting and rich diversity of specific threats the
groups are seen as posing.
We have seen, then, strong support for Hypotheses 1–4. In
addition, we note that Cottrell, Neuberg, and Asher (2004) used
Figure 2. Participants’ mean affective reactions to activist feminists, fundamentalist Christians, and gay men,
relative to affective reactions to European Americans. A significant Target Group  Emotion Experienced
interaction, F(8, 1824)  15.98, p  .00001, partial 
2  .065, emerged in a repeated-measures analysis of
variance on the emotion ratings for these three groups, indicating that participants experienced different patterns
of emotional reactions to them.
779 A SOCIOFUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO INTERGROUP AFFECTnearly identical procedures and measures in three additional sam-
ples. These other studies demonstrate patterns of threat perceptions
and affective reactions strikingly similar to the ones we reported
here and thus strongly corroborate our findings.
7
Hypothesis 5: Profiles of the Specific Threats Posed by
Different Groups Will Reliably and Systematically Predict
the Emotion Profiles Evoked by These Groups
If intergroup emotion indeed represents a functional response to
intergroup threat, then we should observe the hypothesized threat–
emotion links articulated in Table 2. We explored these hypothe-
sized connections using two essentially independent tests—one
based on correlations among the measures, the other based on
means of the measures.
Multiple regression approach. To predict each discrete emo-
tion from the 10 specific threats, controlling for the influence of
the other threats, we pursued a multiple regression strategy. The
intercorrelations among specific threats and between all threats
and all emotions were substantial, however, leading to special
statistical problems (e.g., multicollinearity, suppression) and ren-
dering findings from these models hard to interpret. We thus used
instead the threat classes articulated in Table 2. Specifically, we
averaged the 6 threats from the “obstacles” category (i.e., threats to
economic resources, property, personal freedoms, reciprocity [by
choice], social coordination, and trust), and the 2 threats from the
“contamination” category (threats to group health and values). The
2 remaining threats—of physical danger and nonreciprocity be-
cause of inability—were represented as before.
8
We examined threat–emotion relations across target groups.
Recall that participants rated all nine groups on threat perceptions
and emotional reactions. To avoid complex technical issues related
to nonindependence of data, each participant was randomly as-
signed to provide threat and emotion ratings for only one of the
target groups, thereby yielding approximately equal numbers of
entries for each group. This random sample of the complete data
set thus contained information on all four threat categories and all
five discrete emotions across the nine target groups; this enabled
7 Some of those findings were reported in preliminary form (Neuberg &
Cottrell, 2002). The full data sets from these additional samples are
available from the authors on request.
8 CFAs also offer some empirical support for this decision to arrange the
10 specific threats into four threat classes. We tested a higher order threat
model with the second-order obstacles factor (on which six first-order
threat factors load), the second-order contamination factor (on which two
first-order threat factors load), the first-order physical safety threat factor,
and the first-order nonreciprocity (by inability) threat factor. For each
target group, this model demonstrated a marginally adequate fit to the data
(as shown by CFI, RMSEA, and SRMR values). Although this four-factor
threat model may be less than ideal to capture relationships among the
threats, our current purposes rest with explaining threat–emotion links. As
such, we have chosen to use this threat representation in which specific
threats believed to elicit the same emotion are clustered together into threat
classes. Note that the less than ideal status of this measurement model can
only work against our hypotheses relating obstacle threats to anger and
contamination threats to disgust.
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780 COTTRELL AND NEUBERGus to perform five regression analyses, each predicting one emo-
tion from the four threat categories, thereby allowing us to assess
the independent predictive ability of each threat for each emotion.
Because a huge number of different subsamples could be randomly
drawn from the complete sample, we conducted these analyses on
50 randomly selected subsamples to reduce the likelihood of
drawing conclusions from data patterns idiosyncratic to particular
chance samplings. Though not identical, this strategy is somewhat
similar to bootstrapping and resampling procedures.
In Table 5, we present the mean standardized regression coef-
ficients, averaged across the 50 random subsamples, for each
threat category in the regression of each emotion. Note that the
general pattern of regression coefficients provides yet another
demonstration of the problem associated with conceiving inter-
group affect and threat as unidimensional constructs: Different
intergroup emotions are predominantly associated with different
classes of threat. We turn now to the regression analyses for each
emotion, in turn.
In line with the hypothesized theoretical connections articulated
in Table 2, we expected anger to be independently predicted by
obstacle threats; this was clearly the case (average   .58, p 
.001). We also hypothesized that anger might be a secondary
emotional reaction to threats to group health and group values; the
contamination category did indeed predict anger (average   .11,
p  .001). We also speculated that anger might be secondarily
associated with threats to physical safety and reciprocity (because
of lack of ability); these speculations were not supported.
Figure 3. Participants’ mean threat perceptions for activist feminists, African Americans, and fundamentalist
Christians, relative to threat perceptions for European Americans. A repeated-measures analysis of variance on
the threat ratings for these three groups revealed a significant Target Group  Threat Perceived interaction, F(18,
4122)  30.05, p  .00001, partial 
2  .116, indicating that participants perceived different patterns of threat
from these groups and thus illustrating support for Hypothesis 3. Reciprocity (Choice)  nonreciprocity by
choice; Reciprocity (Inability)  nonreciprocity by inability.
Table 5
Regressions of Each Emotion on Threat Categories
Dependent
variable
Independent variable
Obstacles Contamination
Physical
safety threat
Nonreciprocity
by inability
Anger .58*a .11*b .03c .00c
Disgust .36*a .35*a .07*b .04*c
Fear .30*a .01b .37*a .05*c
Pity .08*a .20*b .10*c .17*b
Envy .18*a .00b .06*c .08*d
Note. Table entries are mean standardized regression coefficients across 50
random samples. Primary predictions are in boldface type; more explor-
atory, secondary predictions are in italics; and predictions of noneffects are
in conventional font. Entries marked with an asterisk are significantly
different from zero (p  .05). Entries marked with different subscripts
within each row differ from each other (p  .05).
781 A SOCIOFUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO INTERGROUP AFFECTSecond, we expected that disgust would be independently pre-
dicted by contamination; this hypothesis, too, was strongly sup-
ported (average   .35, p  .001). We also thought that two of
the obstacle threats in particular (i.e., to personal freedoms and
reciprocity relations) might secondarily predict disgust; although
obstacle threat as a general class did independently predict disgust
(average   .36, p  .001), the outcomes of our more specific
speculations were clearly mixed (see Table 6).
Third, we expected that fear would be independently predicted
by physical safety threat. This hypothesis was strongly supported
(average   .37, p  .001), as was our general secondary
prediction that obstacle threats might also independently predict
fear (average   .30, p  .001). A perusal of Table 6, however,
reveals that the success of our specific secondary predictions
regarding specific obstacles was mixed.
Fourth, we expected that pity would be independently predicted
by the inability to reciprocate, and this was clearly the case
(average   .17, p  .001). Our lone secondary hypothesis—that
pity would also be independently associated with the possibility of
disease contamination—was supported as well: Contamination in
general predicted pity (average   .20, p  .001); however, this
was due to both the disease and the values components of the
contamination aggregate (see Table 6).
Finally, we expected that envy would be independently pre-
dicted by the obstacle of economic threat. Consistent with this,
envy was predicted by obstacle threat in the aggregate (average
  .18, p  .001). Moreover, a perusal of Table 6 reveals that this
obstacles–envy link was indeed driven largely by economic threat
in particular.
In sum, our primary predictions regarding the functional links
between threat classes and their affiliated emotions find strong
support in these data: Obstacle threat emerged as an independent
predictor of anger, contamination threat emerged as an indepen-
dent predictor of disgust, physical safety threat emerged as an
independent predictor of fear, and reciprocity threat because of
inability emerged as an independent predictor of pity. In addition,
many of our secondary predictions were borne out as well. Indeed,
taking stock of the 20 entries in Table 5, we see that (a) all four of
our primary hypotheses (bolded entries) were supported and (b)
five of our eight secondary hypotheses (italicized entries) were
supported. As further support of our hypotheses, we note that no
threat class expected to show a secondary association with an
emotion emerged as a better independent predictor than the threat
class expected to show a primary association with that emotion.
Though our accuracy in predicting null findings (entries in con-
ventional font) may appear less than ideal, these mean regression
coefficients are numerically rather small and, in fact, never exceed
a coefficient whose significance is expected as the result of a
primary or secondary prediction. This overall success rate can be
contrasted with the straightforward alternative that there is no
specificity of links between threat classes and emotions, opera-
tionalized such that no threat classes independently predict specific
emotions or that all threat classes independently and equivalently
predict all emotions—neither of which received empirical support
from our data.
Hypothesis 5 addresses the crux of our theoretical arguments—
the notion that specific threats elicit functionally focused emotions.
To fully appreciate intergroup emotions, then, the focus should be
on specific threat perceptions rather than on the particular group
thought to pose a threat. In this sense, the nine target groups
considered in this research are secondary in interest to the threats
associated with each group. Threats, as compared with target
group, should be better predictors of emotions. This, of course, is
an empirical question: How well do target groups per se predict
emotional response after controlling for the four threat classes?
To better gauge the size of this effect, we dummy coded the
target groups and compared the proportions of variation in each
emotional reaction explained by four effects: effect of threats,
effect of threats controlling for target group, effect of target group,
and effect of target group controlling for threats. In Table 7, we
present the mean R
2 values, averaged across the 50 random
subsamples for each of these effects in the regression of each
emotion. First, we note that the threat classes, as a set, account for
a substantial amount of variation in each emotion (especially in the
cases of anger, disgust, and fear). Moreover, this effect remains
sizable after controlling for the target group being rated. In com-
parison, target group tends to account for a much smaller, though
still significant, portion of variation in emotional response. Crucial
to our theoretical arguments, this effect significantly decreases
even further after controlling for the threat classes. Threat percep-
tions therefore appear (at least) to partially mediate the observed
group differences in emotional reactions. In theory, we would have
hoped for complete mediation. Of course, even if complete medi-
ation by threats exists, it would be difficult to uncover in this
investigation because (a) we have not included in our analyses all
threat perceptions relevant to emotional reactions (we do not claim
to be providing a veritable census of threats); (b) for statistical
stability reasons given our sample size, we only estimated main
effects of threat perceptions on emotional reactions, thereby not
including any of the ways in which the many possible interactions
among our 10 threats might account for apparent target group
effects; and (c) none of our threat perceptions and emotional
reactions were measured perfectly, without error. It is thus the case
Table 6
Regressions to Test Exploratory, Secondary Predictions
Dependent
variable
Threats
Obstacles category
Economic Property Freedoms
Reciprocity
(choice)
Social
coordination Trust
Disgust .05*a .01b .26*c .05*d .38*e .37*e
Fear .08*a .18*b .24*c .01d .20*b .12*e
Envy .20*a .11*b .10*b .04*c .04*c .00d
Contamination category
Health Values
Pity .15*a .13*a
Note. Table entries are mean standardized regression coefficients result-
ing from the analyses of the 50 random subsamples in which each specific
named threat (a) was included as the only member of its category (i.e.,
obstacle or contamination) and (b) served as an independent variable, along
with the three remaining threat categories, in predicting the emotion of
focus. Entries marked with an asterisk are significantly different from zero
(p  .05). Entries marked with different subscripts within each row differ
from each other (p  .05).
782 COTTRELL AND NEUBERGthat the unique effects of target group on emotions, as small as they
are, actually overestimate their true sizes. Using the multiple
regression approach, then, we see strong support for
Hypothesis 5.
9
Cluster analytic approach. Hypothesis 5 posits, generally, that
emotion profiles map onto threat profiles. In addition to the mul-
tiple regression approach, then, one can alternatively test this
hypothesis by assessing the extent to which groups seen to pose
similar patterns of threat also evoke similar patterns of emotion. To
the extent they do not, support for Hypothesis 5 would be
weakened.
Cluster analysis (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1992) is a
“technique for grouping individuals or objects into clusters so that
objects in the same cluster are more like each other than they are
like objects in other clusters” (p. 265), and recent uses of this
analysis (Fiske et al., 2002; Lickel et al., 2000) have indeed proven
valuable in identifying clusters of groups and their common char-
acteristics. As a multivariate technique, cluster analysis is espe-
cially well suited for our purposes, because it can calculate simi-
larities and differences among mean profiles of multiple threat or
emotion ratings. One convenient technical implication of this is
that cluster analysis is not susceptible to issues of multicollinearity
and suppression, both of which complicated our attempt to perform
simple multiple regression analyses using the 10 specific threats. A
second implication is that it essentially provides an independent
test of the hypothesis using the same data set.
We began by averaging the participants’ ratings of each of the
nine groups for each of the 10 specific threats and each of the five
discrete emotions. Though we could cluster analyze threat and
emotion scores representing differences relative to the threat and
emotion scores for European Americans (as we did when testing
Hypotheses 1–4, for the reasons discussed above), we chose to
average and analyze original threat and emotion ratings for all nine
groups, thereby including European Americans as a group in the
cluster analyses. We expected that the participants’ in-groups (that
is, European Americans and nonfundamentalist Christians) might
form a single cluster, with threat and emotion profiles differing
from those of the other clusters. The use of original threat and
emotion ratings for European Americans, as well as the other
groups, allows us to explore this idea and to better examine
similarities and differences in the profiles. We note that cluster
analyses on the difference scores and cluster analyses on the
original scores yield identical results (except for the necessary
absence of European Americans from the cluster solutions for
difference scores).
Following the advice and example presented in Hair et al.
(1992), we used two types of cluster analysis, each serving a
different purpose. Hierarchical cluster analysis is particularly use-
ful to determine the optimal number of clusters present in the data,
whereas k-means cluster analysis is particularly useful to deter-
mine the arrangement of the nine groups within these clusters.
Hierarchical cluster analysis operates on a similarity matrix
containing similarity indices among the objects being clustered (in
this case, the nine target groups), using some set of characteristics
of each object (the profiles of 10 threats or five emotions). These
similarity measures, which involve no decisions about the appro-
priate number of clusters within the data, offer an additional
straightforward test of Hypothesis 5: To the extent there exists a
positive correlation between threat similarity measures and emo-
tion similarity measures, then Hypothesis 5 is further supported.
Because it is the most commonly used measure of interobject
similarity (Hair et al., 1992), we calculated the euclidean distance
between each pair of objects two times, once using the threat
profiles and once using the emotion profiles. The correlation
coefficient between these threat-based distances and emotion-
based distances was .41 (p  .013), indicating that groups that are
similar on threat profiles are also similar on emotion profiles,
supporting Hypothesis 5.
We note above that these similarity measures offer no explicit
information about the optimal number of clusters in the data or the
arrangement of groups into the clusters. As an extension of the
demonstrated relationship between the threat and emotion similar-
ity measures, however, we might reasonably expect the specific
arrangement of groups into “threat clusters” to map onto the
specific arrangement of groups into “emotion clusters.” Because
our theoretical framework assigns causal priority to perceived
threats, we first performed hierarchical cluster analysis (using
Ward’s method) on the ratings of the specific threats ostensibly
posed by the nine target groups. Although decisions about the best
fitting number of clusters are inherently subjective, we adhered to
conventional decision rules as outlined in Hair et al. (1992),
Blashfield and Aldenderfer (1988), and Everitt and Dunn (2001).
The agglomeration schedule of a hierarchical cluster analysis spec-
ifies the groups that are merged in each stage of the analysis and
provides coefficients that indicate the distances between these
9 We note two additional pieces of corroborative evidence for Hypoth-
esis 5. First, we tested the hypothesized threat–emotion links using group-
level multiple regression analyses with the threat and emotion ratings for
each target group averaged across all participants; these analyses are
limited by the small sample size (nine target groups), which leaves them
drastically underpowered. We also tested the hypothesized threat–emotion
links using multilevel models that clustered the target group ratings by
participant; these analyses provide an appropriate statistical means to
account for the nonindependence of target group ratings. In all, both the
group-level regression analyses and the multilevel models revealed similar
patterns of specific threat–emotion links to those obtained from the
individual-level regression analyses on the random samples.
Table 7
Regressions to Compare Effects of Group Type and Threat
Perceptions
DV
Proportion of variation in DV explained by
Threats
Threats
controlling for
group Group
Group
controlling for
threats
Anger .49a .46b .07c .03d
Disgust .48a .44b .11c .06d
Fear .36a .29b .10c .04d
Pity .13a .10b .15c .12a
Envy .05a .05bc .05ac .06b
Note. Table entries are mean R
2 values (across 50 random samples) for
each of these four effects in the regression of each emotion. All entries are
significantly different from zero (p  .05). Entries not sharing a common
subscript within each row differ from each other (p  .05). DV 
dependent variable.
783 A SOCIOFUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO INTERGROUP AFFECTnewly merged groups. Because a large agglomeration coefficient
indicates that two relatively different groups have been combined,
typical guidelines suggest selecting the number of clusters prior to
a large increase in the agglomeration coefficient. Guided by these
decision rules, a five-cluster solution offered the best fit to the
threat profile data.
We next turned to k-means cluster analysis on the threat ratings
to determine how the nine target groups fit into the five clusters.
Because differences in the randomly chosen initial cluster centers
may alter the final cluster solution (Hair et al., 1992), we con-
ducted this analysis multiple times on the same data configured in
different arrangements to establish the most stable five-cluster
solution, which is presented in the left side of Table 8.
Moving to emotional responses, k-means cluster analysis was
next performed on the ratings of the discrete emotions participants
experienced when considering these same nine groups. As noted
above, we give causal precedence to perceived threats. We there-
fore constrained this analysis of the emotion ratings to a five-
cluster solution, because this was the most appropriate solution for
the threat ratings. This cluster analysis was also performed multi-
ple times to establish the most stable five-cluster solution, which is
presented in the right side of Table 8.
As Table 8 clearly shows, there is great overlap between the
clusters emerging from the analysis of threat perceptions and the
clusters emerging from the analysis of emotional experiences:
Groups seen as similar in the patterns of threats they pose were
also seen as similar in the patterns of emotions they elicited.
Indeed, the only difference between the two cluster analyses in-
volves the movement of Asian Americans: In the threat analysis,
Asian Americans clustered with Native Americans (Cluster 4)
because of the perception that these two groups both hold values
inconsistent with mainstream American values. In the emotions
analysis, Asian Americans clustered with European Americans and
nonfundamentalist Christians because of the relatively little threat-
related affect elicited by these groups. Aside from this single
change, however, the two cluster solutions, derived from analyses
of different judgments, are strikingly similar. The probability of
observing a perfect replication with all nine groups considered in
the calculation, merely by chance, is .00006. We adjusted this
value to account for the “defection” by the single group (i.e., Asian
Americans); the probability of observing this slightly imperfect
match between the two cluster solutions merely by chance remains
a very small .0003.
10 In sum, groups that clustered together on
perceived threat also (nearly perfectly) clustered together on elic-
ited emotions, thereby providing further support for Hypothesis 5.
Discussion
We derived five general hypotheses from our sociofunctional
analysis of intragroup and intergroup relations and tested them by
examining European American participants’ reactions to a variety
of ethnic, religious, and ideologically oriented groups encountered
frequently within the United States. As predicted, (a) different
groups can evoke different profiles of emotions; (b) prejudice, as
traditionally measured, can obscure the rich texture of these emo-
tional experiences; (c) different groups are often believed to pose
different profiles of threat to one’s in-group; and (d) measures of
general threat can mask the rich texture of these threat perceptions.
We believe these data are the first to provide straightforward
empirical support for Hypotheses 2 and 4.
Two sets of analyses also support our fifth hypothesis—that
emotional experience arises systematically from threat perception:
(a) The perception of particular threats predicted the experience of
functionally associated emotions, and (b) groups that elicited sim-
ilar threat profiles also elicited similar emotion profiles. Although
each statistical technique has its own limitations, the cumulative
evidence from these analyses offers strong support for Hypothesis
5. Of course, a stronger causal test of Hypothesis 5 is impossible
given the correlational nature of our data and participants’ preex-
isting feelings toward and beliefs about the real-world groups we
selected. A more rigorous test would require participants to re-
spond to novel or artificial groups about which we could system-
atically manipulate specific patterns of threats and subsequently
measure patterns of emotional response.
11
Contributions of the Present Data
Our data illustrate quite clearly that the traditional operational-
ization of prejudice—as a general attitude—can obscure the rich-
10 Because we assign causal priority to perceived threat, we wanted to
calculate the probability of perfectly replicating the five-cluster solution on
the basis of threat ratings (as shown in the left side of Table 8) in the
emotion cluster analyses. After determining the probability of replicating
each individual cluster, we calculated the product of these individual
probabilities to obtain the probability of a perfect match between the
five-cluster threat solution and an emotion cluster solution. We calculated
this probability to be .00006. Because Asian Americans were the only
group to “move” clusters from our threat cluster solution to our emotion
cluster solution, we recalculated this probability without Asian Americans.
For this probability of perfect replication with only the eight remaining
groups, we obtained a value of .0003. Information on these calculations is
available from the authors.
11 We are currently collecting such experimental data.
Table 8
Five-Cluster Solutions From Threat and Emotion Cluster Analyses
Cluster Threat clusters Emotion clusters
1 African Americans; Mexican Americans African Americans; Mexican Americans
2 Fundamentalist Christians; activist feminists Fundamentalist Christians; activist feminists
3 Gay men Gay men
4 Native Americans; Asian Americans Native Americans
5 European Americans; nonfundamentalist
Christians
European Americans; nonfundamentalist
Christians; Asian Americans
784 COTTRELL AND NEUBERGness of emotional experience that groups elicit from others: People
do not merely experience evaluative valence when encountering
members of groups but instead experience discrete emotions.
Moreover, as our threat and emotion profiles make clear, groups
cannot be simply characterized as posing one particular threat or as
eliciting one particular emotion. Rather, groups are seen to pose
multiple threats and to elicit a variety of emotions, often in
interesting combinations. In all, then, the negative implications of
adhering to the traditional view of prejudice may be substantial.
Just as emotion profiles varied across groups, so did threat
profiles. The current data thus also suggest a complement to the
traditional view of stereotype as trait. Specifically, the sociofunc-
tional approach presumes that the most important stereotypical
knowledge should be knowledge that is relevant to the threats and
opportunities the out-group provides for the in-group. Indeed, we
suspect that most stereotypical knowledge can usefully be framed
in terms of the stable beliefs about the threats and opportunities
groups are seen to pose. That is, particular groups are stereotypi-
cally characterized as lazy because they are perceived to contribute
less than their fair share, as aggressive because they are perceived
to threaten physical safety, and so on.
More generally, we should note the uniqueness of the data we
report here. In terms of affect, we have gathered data about a wide
range of emotional reactions people have toward a variety of
groups. Although a few others have assessed such a range of
emotions, they have mitigated somewhat the value of doing so by
aggregating over them (e.g., Brewer & Alexander, 2002; Dijker,
1987; Esses et al., 1993; Fiske et al., 2002). In terms of beliefs, we
have begun to document a wide variety of threats that may be
stereotypically linked to a variety of groups well known within the
United States; to our knowledge, no similar data set exists. Be-
cause we have maintained the discrete nature of the assessed
emotions and threats, other researchers testing hypotheses of in-
tergroup affect and threat gain access to a useful, rich set of data.
Beyond their usefulness for testing our hypotheses, then, these data
should also provide researchers with textured descriptive data
about how (at least some) people view and feel toward a range of
different groups.
We acknowledge, of course, that the reactions of our European
American university students to specific groups will not corre-
spond perfectly with the reactions of others in different places and
at other times. The threats, and resultant emotional reactions, that
members of a particular group associate with another group should
emerge from the functional relationship between the two groups as
well as associated sociohistorical factors (e.g., Brewer & Alex-
ander, 2002; Fiske et al., 2002). Thus, the current sample should
represent well the emotional and stereotypical content held by
other samples only to the extent they share similar functional
relationships with the groups we have explored here. To the extent,
however, that other samples have different functional relationships
with these target groups, they should form different threat profiles
and experience a different configuration of emotions. For example,
because African American and Mexican American respondents
differ in the threats they see European Americans posing to their
own groups, they should also differ in their emotional reactions to
European Americans—and they do (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2003).
Note, however, that such variation across perceiver samples in
the specific threat perceptions and feelings evoked by target
groups does not imply that these samples will exhibit different
mappings between specific threats and specific emotions: Regard-
less of sample, we expect that particular profiles of emotional
experience (e.g., those dominated by fear) will emerge systemat-
ically from conceptually relevant profiles of threat (i.e., those
dominated by perceived threat to physical safety). In a similar
vein, individuals who differ from one another in their inclinations
toward particular threat appraisals (e.g., individual differences in
perceived vulnerability to disease) should differ from one another
in the particular intergroup emotions they typically experience
(e.g., disgust; see Schaller, Park, & Faulkner, 2003).
A careful look at the emotion profile for Asian Americans
reveals a potentially interesting discovery: Our European Ameri-
can participants reported significant general negative prejudice
toward Asian Americans but little or no specific threat-related
emotions. Across at least four data sets collected by our lab, we
have consistently found a similar affect profile for Asian Ameri-
cans (although slight envy emerges in some samples). This anom-
aly may be the result of simple and relatively uninteresting causes.
In particular, we might surmise that reports of envy toward Asian
Americans could appear unjustified or “unsportsmanlike” in a
society that so values meritocracy. That is, Americans may tend to
view Asian American successes as deserved achievements and
thus may be reluctant to admit to or report feeling envious of them.
Alternatively, it may be that the high status accorded to Asian
Americans may be identity threatening, leading individuals to
experience specific emotions other than those explored here, such
as schadenfreude (pleasure in another’s misfortune)—an emotion
potentially directed toward high-status groups that come upon hard
times.
12 In all, we are intrigued by the various possibilities and
encourage other researchers to explore more deeply specific feel-
ings toward Asian Americans and other higher status groups.
Finally, because research findings lend support to the theoretical
frameworks that hypothesize their existence, the current data sup-
port the usefulness of our broader sociofunctional approach. That
these data may also be viewed as consistent with predictions
generated from alternative frameworks does not preclude their
value for the sociofunctional approach as well; we return to this
point below.
Related Theoretical Perspectives
We overviewed in the introduction other research programs and
perspectives that take seriously the potential roles that intergroup
emotions and tangible intergroup threats play in characterizing
prejudice and intergroup relations. Here, within the context of
addressing several important theoretical issues, we briefly high-
light some similarities and differences among these alternative,
and sometimes complementary, approaches.
Specificity of Emotion, Specificity of Threat
Along with others, we propose that the traditional view of
prejudice as general attitude is too gross. As our data indeed
demonstrate, prejudices go beyond mere negative feelings toward
groups to also reflect patterns of specific emotions—anger, fear,
disgust, and the like—patterns that conventional measures of prej-
12 We thank Naomi Ellemers for suggesting this interesting possibility.
785 A SOCIOFUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO INTERGROUP AFFECTudice mask. This recognition is important because, as reviewed
above, qualitatively different emotions tend to be associated with
qualitatively different actions: People have the urge to aggress
against those who anger them, escape those who frighten them,
and avoid close contact with those who disgust them. Researchers
who thus ignore the differences in emotion profiles elicited by
different groups will have great difficulty making fine-grained
predictions about intergroup behavior. Of course, if one’s aim is
only to predict whether a group is likely to be discriminated
against, in general, then a general attitude assessment may indeed
be sufficient. We suspect, however, that there are important im-
plications, theoretical and practical, of being discriminated against
via attack, avoidance, or quarantine, and so we prefer the finer
level distinctions.
Proponents of alternative models of intergroup affect generally
share this view, although there exist some important differences in
preferred level of emotion specificity. For instance, Dijker, Fiske,
and their colleagues (Dijker, 1987; Dijker, Koomen, et al., 1996;
Fiske et al., 1999, 2002) have used exploratory factor analyses to
reduce the number of specific emotions they actually assess to a
somewhat smaller set to be analyzed. We think this strategy is less
than ideal, for several reasons.
First, by its very nature, exploratory analyses force data aggre-
gation in a manner uninformed by insights from the emotions
literature, which is increasingly recognizing important distinctions
among the different emotions (e.g., Ekman, 1999). Second, such
an aggregation strategy increases the likelihood that functionally
important emotions may be artificially eliminated from investiga-
tion because of idiosyncratic features of the analysis (e.g., the other
emotions judged, the criteria chosen to select factor dimensions,
the relative reliabilities of the different items). Third, for the same
reasons that exploratory factor analyses may lead one to omit
theoretically relevant emotions, they may also lead one to overag-
gregate emotions. Finally, the strategy of data-driven aggregation
can lead to groups being characterized as similar when they are
not.
In the research we report here, we have chosen to maintain the
demonstrated distinctions among potential intergroup emotions.
Note that if our choice of this finer grain size were a poor one, the
hypothesized differences in emotion profiles across groups would
not have materialized; if contempt, for example, were the more
appropriate level of analysis, then we would have observed no
differences in participants’ reports of anger and disgust. Partici-
pants did indeed make such differentiations, however, lending
support to our chosen level of affect specificity.
We have taken a similar view when contemplating the ap-
propriate specificity at which to consider intergroup threat. In
particular, we rely on a theory-driven analysis in which distinct
threats remain empirically distinguished from each other. Re-
call that the revised integrated threat theory (Stephan & Renfro,
2002; Stephan & Stephan, 2000) posits that four general cate-
gories of constructs—realistic threats to the in-group, symbolic
threats to the in-group, realistic threats to the individual, sym-
bolic threats to the individual—are important in intergroup
relations. There is clearly some overlap in our approaches.
However, in the absence of finer distinctions among threats,
revised integrated threat theory will be unable to account for the
observed variation in emotional responses to different groups
within each umbrella category.
Alternative Appraisal Theories
The perspectives on intergroup emotions we discuss here share
the assumption that different emotions emerge from different
appraisals. The approaches differ, however, in their underlying
appraisal frameworks. Our sociofunctional perspective proposes
that perceptions of specific threats to (and opportunities for) tan-
gible in-group resources and group structures and processes lead to
specific intergroup emotions. We articulate our underlying threat-
based appraisal theory in detail—see Table 2—and have tested its
usefulness via multiple regression and cluster analyses. One im-
plication of this appraisal approach is that it allows for the possi-
bility that groups can be perceived as posing multiple threats to
one’s own group. This, in turn, suggests the value of examining
profiles of perceived threats—a value validated by the findings
reported here.
In contrast to our threat-based appraisal system, the stereotype
content model and image theory look for the sources of emotional
response in appraisals of the structural relationships between
groups. The stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 1999, 2002)
proposes that intergroup emotions result from individuals’ assess-
ments of other groups’ warmth (warm vs. cold) and competence
(competent vs. incompetent), which emerge from perceptions of
each group’s competition and status, respectively. These warmth
and competence dimensions combine to form a matrix of four
possible general views of other groups, and each quadrant engen-
ders a different emotion. An implication of this framework, then,
is an exclusive focus on these four emotions (admiration, envy,
pity, and contempt). In addition to neglecting the common inter-
group emotion of fear, then, and aggregating across anger and
disgust, this view does not straightforwardly imply the usefulness
of characterizing prejudices in terms of emotional profiles. Along
slightly different lines, image theory (M. G. Alexander et al., 1999;
Brewer & Alexander, 2002) suggests that emotional responses
arise from perceptions of other groups on three dimensions: com-
petition, status, and power. Different configurations of these ap-
praisal dimensions produce different images of the other groups,
and each image evokes unique specific emotions. Because groups
are presumably represented by only one image, image theory also
does not straightforwardly suggest the value of characterizing
prejudices in terms of emotion profiles.
The comprehensive operating appraisal framework underlying
IET (e.g., Mackie et al., 2000) has not been explicitly articulated
but appears to be based on an integration of existing appraisal
theories of emotion (prominently cited are Frijda, 1986; Roseman,
1984; Scherer, 1988; C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). That IET
theorists have tended to focus their empirical work narrowly on
individual components of their apparent appraisal framework may
explain an empirical difficulty they recently encountered. Specif-
ically, they predicted that in intergroup situations involving poten-
tial threats to personal freedoms and beliefs, participants would
respond with anger toward the out-group if the in-group was
relatively strong and with fear if the in-group was relatively weak;
only the predicted anger reaction emerged, however (Mackie et al.,
2000). In a later study, however, in which participants faced a
scenario involving physical altercation, the predicted fear response
was obtained (Devos et al., 2002). These findings—though not
initially predicted by the IET theorists—are consistent with our
threat-based appraisal framework, in which threats to physical
786 COTTRELL AND NEUBERGsafety elicit fear, and obstructions of important goals elicit anger.
Nonetheless, some of the similarities between our two approaches
appear striking enough that we have suggested elsewhere that one
might profitably view the IET and a sociofunctional perspective as
complementary, with the IET nested within the broader sociofunc-
tional approach (Neuberg & Cottrell, 2002).
Theoretical Breadth
We note one additional difference between the sociofunctional
framework and the alternatives we have discussed here. Whereas
these others are explicitly about prejudice, intergroup affect, or
stereotype content, ours is not. The foundation of the sociofunc-
tional framework is an understanding of the universal nature of
intragroup structures and processes, and from the foundations of
the developing theory, we have derived implications for intergroup
affect. However, we have also derived implications for the per-
sonal characteristics and traits that people are likely to value (and
devalue) for different kinds of groups, for the aspects of self that
people are likely to present or manufacture in different social
settings, for the kinds of social information that perceivers are
especially likely to seek and attune themselves to, for the areas in
which legal systems across the globe ought to be similar (or
different) from one another, for commonalities (and differences) in
the social teachings of different religions, and so forth. We have
begun to accumulate data in several of these domains, and they are
proving to be consistent with the sociofunctional approach (e.g.,
Cottrell & Neuberg, 2004; Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li, 2003; Neuberg
& Story, 2003). The sociofunctional framework is thus broader in
its scope. All else being equal, this lends some degree of advantage
to it over alternative, but narrower, frameworks.
Closing Remarks
There can be little doubt that the concept of prejudice has been
a useful one and will remain useful to the extent that one is
primarily interested in making general predictions across a broad
class of discriminatory behaviors. As with most scientific endeav-
ors, however, the deeper one wants to probe and the more one
wants to understand, the more precise and textured one’s concep-
tual and operational tools must become. The data reported here
clearly illustrate that the traditional view of prejudice—conceptu-
alized as a general attitude and operationalized via simple evalu-
ation items—is often too gross a tool for understanding the often
highly textured nature of intergroup affect.
Moreover, we believe the sociofunctional approach is better able
to account for these findings than current alternatives, none of
which make the full set of predictions we have tested here. Finally,
many of the currently dominant theoretical explorations of preju-
dice focus on process—on how prejudices are activated, how they
influence cognition and action, how individual and group variables
influence these processes, and so forth. By focusing on the con-
tents of social and intergroup relations, we believe the sociofunc-
tional approach provides an important complement to these
models.
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